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The decade of the 1980s has been called the "lost 
decade", mainly in terms of the economic growth, 
investment and output of the countries of the region. 
However, the fragmentary evidence available makes 
such a summary description seem inappropriate for 
what happened in the social area. In view of the 
institutional inertia, the delayed effects of policies 
conceived and implemented under more favourable 
economic conditions than those of the 1980s, and 
particularly the will of governments to render some 
areas of welfare independent of economic fluctua-
tions, a subtler evaluation of social development 
during the decade is called for. 
This study seeks to contribute to a better under-
standing of the significance of the social trends dur-
ing this period. It attempts to do so, first, on the basis 
of an analysis of the most reliable information avail-
able on the changes that took place in three impor-
tant spheres of social welfare —employment, 
education and health— seeking thereby to pinpoint 
the direction which these changes took. Second, it 
presents an interpretative framework which, in the 
opinion of the authors, is an aid in tackling the 
complex task of weighing the advances and retreats 
of the various indicators of social development. The 
interpretation rests basically on the distinction 
between what we will call the soft and the hard goals 
of social policy and on the identification of some of 
the factors that probably determine the degree of 
hardness of such goals. The article ends by proposing 
a definition of social development that incorporates 
as central objectives welfare, equity, and democracy, 
together with some general guidelines for measuring 
progress towards those objectives. 
•Principal Social Affairs Officer, ECLAC Social Devel-
opment Division. 
"Consultant to the ECLAC Social Development 
Division. 
The authors are grateful to Adolfo Gurrieri and Enzo 
Falleto for their suggestions and comments on a prelimi-
nary version of this study. 
Introduction 
During the 1980s, government officials, 
politicians, academics and professionals in the 
social field were increasingly concerned to 
establish the various effects of the economic 
crisis and the restructuring of production on the 
living conditions of the population and thus to 
obtain diagnoses that would provide proper 
guidance for action. However, given the scarcity 
and poor quality of the data available for the task, 
this concern was centred on an attempt to find 
more precise meaning in the changes in the 
move familiar social indicators, particularly 
those that did not react to the crisis as expected. 
Indeed, while some aspects of social welfare 
certainly deteriorated in a way consistent with 
the profound breakdown of the economy, others, 
including some considered decisive for 
improvement of living conditions, continued to 
show clear signs of progress. Thus, together 
with the long string of negative effects of the 
crisis (higher proportion of households below 
the poverty line; higher rates of open 
unemployment and various forms of 
underemployment; fewer resources allocated by 
governments to social areas; lower real wages 
and greater concentration of wealth), in some 
countries of the region, among other advances, 
infant mortality diminished significantly, 
housing infrastructure improved, and rates of 
enrollment at the secondary and higher 
education levels rose. 
This apparent independence of social 
phenomena from each other and between some 
social phenomena and economic phenomena is 
not new. Indeed, the debate on Latin American 
development in recent decades was largely 
dominated by the issue of the unequal 
distribution of the fruits of economic growth. In 
the three decades following World War II such 
growth had exhibited rather high rates —at least 
in comparison with its poor performance now— 
which were not reflected in corresponding 
progress in the social area. In this context and by 
virtue of the lack of confidence in some sectors 
brought on by the overly optimistic picture 
produced by the evolution of the per capita 
product —for a long time considered the 
development indicator par excellence— it was 
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recommended that evaluations of development 
should be supplemented by detailed analyses of 
the behaviour of those indicators that seemed to 
better reflect the changes in the situation of the 
less privileged sectors of society, such as the rates 
of infant mortality, illiteracy or life expectancy. 
The elaboration of the so-called physical quality-
of-life index (Overseas Development Council, 
1978) resulted indeed from this kind of 
approach. What now causes a certain amount of 
perplexity is the manifestation of a 
phenomenon that could be interpreted as the 
1. Initial considerations 
From the viewpoint of changes in the living 
conditions of the population, one of the more 
important consequences of the external debt 
crisis was without a doubt the sharp reduction of 
capacity to absorb labour in the production 
sectors providing jobs that were more stable, 
productive, better paid and better covered by 
social security schemes. The data in table 1 
corroborate this statement: between 1980 and 
1987, for example, Chile was the only one of the 
seven countries examined in which the number 
of people employed in large private companies 
increased. Such growth, slightly higher than that 
of the economically active population (EAP), 
probably stems from the vigorous privatization 
of State enterprises carried out recently in that 
country (Marcel, 1989). In the rest of the 
countries, in contrast , modern-sector 
employment grew much less than the labour 
supply. 
This situation of stagnation and even decline 
in employment and the consequences that flow 
from it represent a clear reversal of the trends 
observed in previous decades. Between I960 and 
1970 the sustained economic growth of most of 
the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean produced modern sectors that 
opposite of the one described above 
(Hirschman, 1987): negative product growth 
rates may be accompanied by positive changes in 
some important dimensions of welfare. 
In order to better understand the nature of 
the relations between social and economic 
changes, we will analyse the changes in some of 
the more important indicators of conditions of 
employment, health and education in a number 
of Latin American countries, specifically those 
that offer reliable information on the period of 
five years or so that the crisis of the 1980s lasted. 
increasingly absorbed more skilled and 
productive human resources, while the part of 
EAP consisting of unskilled labour diminished 
rapidly. This structural occupational mobility, 
although insufficient to reduce the relative size 
of the urban informal sector and the absolute 
number of the poor, at least resulted in an 
increase in relatively well-paid jobs in the formal 
sector, especially in large and medium-sized 
private enterprises, and in jobs in the public 
sector (ECLAC, 1989, p. 6). 
2. Employment in some social categories 
Perhaps the most dramatic effect of the 
economic stagnation as it affected labour was the 
increase in unemployment. Between 1983 and 
1985, at the epicentre of the crisis, 
unemployment rates in many countries reached 
the highest levels ever recorded. In 1987, of the 
14 countries for which comparable information 
with total or partial coverage exists, 11 still had 
unemployment rates higher than those of 1980. 
Table 2 shows the evolution of employment 
according to various social categories in six 
metropolitan areas of the region which are 
sufficiently representative to give an 
approximate idea of the general behaviour of the 
respective countries. The more disaggregated 
I 
Evolution of employment, health and education 
A. Employment 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: INDEX OF THE EVOLUTION OF SOME 
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE INDICATORS FOR 1987 
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Source: ECLAC, provisional estimates on the basis of national data. 
"Includes only non-professional self-employed and non-professional unpaid family workers. 
''Includes enterprises with less than 10 employees, self-employed and professional unpaid family workers. 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: INDEXES OF THE EVOLUTION OF SOME INDICATORS OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOME METROPOLITAN 
AREAS FOR THE YEARS SHOWN 
(First year shown = 100) 
Bototá San José S5o Paulo Montevideo Caracas Buenos Aires 
Colombia Costa Rica Brazil Uruguay Venezuela Argentina 
1979-1986 1979-1988 1977-1987 1981-1986 1978-1986 1980-1986 
Rate of economic 
participation of 
15-19 year-olds 98 




for 15-19 year-olds 
Unemployment rate 
for 20-24 year-olds 
Unemployment rate 
for male heads of 
household aged 25-59 
Unemployment rate 
for female heads of 
household aged 25-59 
Rate of economic 
participation of women 
aged 25-39 in nuclear 
families with children 
under 5 years old 158 
Percentage of accumu-
lated variation of 















































Source: ECLAC, estimates based on household surveys in the respective countries, and Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, recent years. 
"Calculated for the whole country. 
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data in this table show that in comparison with 
the employment situation in each social category 
around 1980 heads of household in at least five of 
the six cities had fewer work opportunities than 
young people, and that in some cases the 
unemployment rates of the beginning of the 
decade trebled. 
As the crisis deepened, young people, 
especially those between 15 and 19 years of age, 
saw the job opportunities suited to their level of 
education increasingly blocked. The increase in 
unemployment prevented the members of this 
age group from at least partially compensating 
for the decline in family income by working. On 
the other hand, many young people left the 
labour market or did not even try to enter it, as 
they would have done under more favourable 
conditions. Perhaps these phenomena help 
explain why the participation rates of young 
people declined more in places where economic 
stagnation was worse. Such seems to be the case, 
for example, of Venezuela and Argentina: of the 
seven countries shown in table 2, they are 
precisely the ones whose economies suffered 
most damage in the period 1981-1988 and which 
also had the biggest decline in the youth 
employment rate. The highest youth rates, in 
contrast, are found in the metropolitan areas of 
Colombia and Costa Rica, countries with the best 
economic performances in the period studied 
(table 2). In these circumstances it would be no 
surprise if at least part of the increase in 
secondary education enrollment during this 
period was due to the fact that in a moré 
favourable jobs market many young people 
would not have continued in the education 
system but did so now because of a lack of job 
opportunities. Likewise, those who had entered 
the jobs market were later removed from it by 
the crisis. Such young people, to the extent that 
they returned to the education system, judged it 
better to wait there for new signs of a recovery of 
demand, while gaining knowledge or 
educational credits that could eventually make 
them more competitive in the labour market. 
Table 2 also shows that in all the cities 
studied there was an increase in the employment 
rates of mothers between 25 and 39 years of age 
with children under five in nuclear families. 
Even though these changes follow a long-term 
trend, their magnitude suggests that the trend 
has grown stronger recently because of the need 
of many women to offset the actual drop in 
family income, i.e., to supplement the reduced 
income of the head of household by entering the 
labour market. This is a highly important 
phenomenon insofar as it has direct 
repercussions on the capacity of households to 
raise and protect the new generations, 
considering that the infrastructure of child-care 
services (kindergartens, pre-school centres) is 
particularly deficient precisely where it is most 
needed. 
3. Employment by economic sectors 
The changes in employment and wages brought 
about by the economic recession varied from 
country to country in step with the gravity of the 
crisis itself and also with the capacity of the 
social forces in each country to mobilize in 
defence of their positions, and with the 
responses of the governments to internal and 
external pressures seeking to influence 
economic and labour policies in one direction or 
another. It is particularly difficult to interpret 
properly the impact of the changes in 
employment on the living conditions of 
households and individuals. This difficulty stems 
from the fact that any interpretation has 
simultaneously to take into consideration 
changes in real wages, rates of open 
unemployment and the quality of the jobs 
obtained. From this angle table 1 —which as we 
know contains data for the seven countries for 
which there was comparable information for the 
years 1980 and 1987— makes it possible to draw 
some conclusions. The table presents, first, the 
distribution by sector of the employed EAP, a 
datum which we take as an approximate 
indication of changes in the quality of jobs. Since 
the factors that determine job quality cannot be 
measured directly, we use a series of assumptions 
that allow us to evaluate, for example, the 
average productivity of one sector in relation to 
other sectors. We proceed in the same fashion 
with job stability, social security coverage and 
social benefits, i.e., we evaluate the services 
provided in one sector in comparison with the 
others. All this permits us finally to place the 
different sectors into three groups: large private 
enterprises, the public sector, and the non-
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professional self-employed. Since small (less 
than 10 workers) private enterprises form a very 
heterogeneous conglomerate with large 
variations in job quality, we will consider them a 
residual category for the moment. Second, we 
examine the rates of open unemployment, 
which account for the relative changes both in 
the abundance or scarcity of job opportunities 
and the willingness of people to take jobs on the 
working and wage terms determined by the 
market at that time. Third, we consider the 
minimum levels of real wages, which once again 
offer an approximate indication, more or less 
accurate depending on the country, of the 
guidelines or reference points used by 
employers, sometimes to negotiate and 
sometimes to set the wages of their employees. 
Brazil and Mexico were the countries in 
which the large private enterprises displayed 
less capacity during the period to absorb the 
growth of EAP. Despite that fact, rates of open 
unemployment declined in both countries, at the 
cost inter alia of a sharp drop in urban real 
minimum wages. As can be seen from the 
significant expansion of non-professional self-
employment, job quality also declined in both 
countries. Unlike the other countries analysed, 
the recruitment of civil servants continued in 
both Brazil and Mexico, to the point where 
Mexico experienced a relatively large expansion 
of the sector, so that a source of jobs remained 
open during the crisis, mainly for educated 
middle-class young people (table 1). 
For their part, Costa Rica, Colombia and 
Argentina, although less affected than Brazil and 
Mexico by stagnation in the capacity of their 
modern sectors to absorb labour, were less 
successful in controlling unemployment rates, 
probably owing to the combination of a series of 
factors, for example high urban real minimum 
wages than in 1980, or less expansion of non-
professional self-employment than in the other 
countries, or the freezing of public-sector 
recruitment. 
Finally, Chile and Venezuela maintained and 
even slightly improved their capacity to absorb 
labour in the more productive sectors. Neverthe-
less, open unemployment in Chile increased 
sharply, while Venezuela's apparent controj of 
unemployment was probably due to a significant 
reduction of urban real minimum wages. But 
what is important to point out here is that, on 
the one hand, both countries appear to have 
carried out policies to freeze public-sector 
recruitment —the relative growth of which was 
in fact clearly lower than the growth of the 
non-agricultural EAP— while, on the other 
hand, in neither of the two countries did non-
professional workers move into self-
employment (table 1). 
When read together these data, although 
fragmentary and dispersed, allow us to venture 
some conjectures or hypotheses —which would 
certainly have to be proven by more complete 
data and analyses— concerning what generally 
happened during the period in those areas of the 
world of labour which most directly influence 
the living conditions of the population. 
The first thing that stands out is the 
relatively broad gamut of employment and 
wages policies that the governments had at hand 
and implemented in order to initiate or reinforce 
the transformation of production and to combat 
the overall deterioration of the economic 
situation and the decline in personal living 
conditions. For example, governments can 
decide whether to impose legal restrictions on 
various non-professional self-employment 
activities. If they do impose such restrictions, 
they can also apply them more or less rigorously. 
Similarly, they can freeze, increase or reduce 
recruitment in the public sector, and they can 
also try to determine, more or less effectively, 
guidelines for higher or lower real wages than 
those prevalent before the crisis. These and 
other interventions by the State in the field of 
employment stem from simultaneous 
consideration of a complex set of factors, which 
interact differently in each country: the available 
resources, the relative weight of various social 
and political pressures, institutional inertia, and 
the government's own programme. If this is the 
case, i.e., that governments do actually proceed 
in this way, it becomes clear that, both in the 
evaluation of the measures used to combat the 
crisis in the area of employment and in the 
measurement of their effect on personal living 
standards, it is totally insufficient to examine 
only real wages, or the rate of open 
unemployment, or the changes in the sectoral 
distribution of the employed EAP. An analysis 
that does not consider the combined effect of the 
various factors would not make it possible to 
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reconstruct the logic behind the measures 
adopted in each country or the logic of the 
measures most frequently used in the region. 
Second, the public sector displays important 
differences in capacity to absorb labour. Of 
course, the extraordinarily vigorous growth of 
public-sector employment during the decades 
preceding the crisis derived fundamentally from 
two complex series of phenomena. One was the 
need to recruit more and more personnel to meet 
the growing demand for social services which 
accompanied the accelerated urbanization of 
those years. The other was related to the political 
pressures exerted by middle-class sectors on the 
State to hire the equally growing number of 
graduates from the education systems, which 
had in the meantime, owing partly to the 
urbanization itself, expanded very rapidly. The 
fiscal crisis that was beginning to be generated 
—or in some cases aggravated— at the 
beginning of the 1980s prevented many 
countries from continuing that policy. Thus, 
subjected to the fiscal-adjustment programmes 
agreed upon with the agencies acting as 
spokesmen for the lending bodies, many Latin 
American countries were forced to shut off 
access to the public sector and reduce the real 
wages of State employees, which fell almost as 
much as those of the non-professional self-
employed (table 3). It is even possible that those 
changes had a more negative effect on the 
educated middle-class young than on other social 
categories. 
Non-professional self-employment, in turn, 
increased in most of the countries, especially 
where the stagnation of the more productive 
sectors was worse. This kind of employment 
probably served as a refuge for the mass of 
unskilled workers who, with little capacity for 
collective pressure, had lost waged jobs or never 
had them. As mentioned above, the drop in 
income among the non-professional self-
employed was greater than in any other 
category. A disproportionately high percentage 
of the so-called recent poor (Kaztman, 1989) is 
probably found in that category. The channeling 
of the labour supply towards self-employment 
was not however automatic. As we have seen, in 
several countries this sector grew less quickly 
during the crisis than the non-agricultural sector 
of EAP. Different government policies can 
facilitate or block access to these jobs. For 
example, the State can grant or deny licenses for 
certain services (taxi-meter permits, newspaper 
stands, stalls in open-air markets, street vendors, 
etc.) or can control or prosecute more or less 
vigorously those who carry on such activities 
without proper municipal authorization. 
Cultural patterns of consumption and stigmas 
associated with certain occupations can also play 
a similar role, i.e., they can block or facilitate the 
access to self-employment of some non-
professional segments of the population. 
But the most striking thing about the period 
under consideration is the noticeable growth in 
most of the countries of employment in small 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: INDEXES OF EARNINGS FROM EMPLOYMENT 
BY YEAR AND BY ECONOMIC SECTOR" 
Economic sector 
Agriculture 
Large private enterprises 























































Source: PREALC, estimates of the evolution of the labour market, 1980-1987. 
"Indues Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela. 
Includes enterprises with fewer than 10 employees, the professional self-employed and professional unpaid family workers. 
includes only the non-professional self-employed and non-professional unpaid family workers. 
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enterprises (i.e., with fewer than 10 workers). 
There is insufficient information to break down 
into homogeneous categories the diversity of 
types of establishment involved. We can, 
however, venture some hypotheses about the 
growth of employment in the sector 
—hypotheses which, given the lack of data, are 
based more on personal observation than on the 
corresponding statistical information. We would 
say, first, that the deficiencies —mostly in 
quality— of State services due to the drastic cut-
back in their resources created gaps in the supply 
of services which were probably filled by private 
companies. Education perhaps provides the 
clearest example: a multitude of schools sprang 
up specializing in rapid training in skills and jobs 
supposedly sought after by the modern sector of 
the economy. However, in response to the 
demand created by the increased number of 
mothers forced to enter the labour market in 
order to supplement insufficient family incomes 
and to the rapid growth in the importance 
attached to pre-school training with respect to a 
child's subsequent performance, a large number 
of pre-school establishments and kindergartens 
also sprang up. Second, because of the need to 
remain competitive during the crisis, large 
private enterprises sought to cut labour costs 
through inter alia the elimination of social-
security costs by contracting small enterprises to 
The most striking thing about health in the first 
seven years of the 1980s is the fact that, despite 
the reduction of resources allocated by 
governments to the sector, the same positive 
trends of the pre-crisis period continued to 
manifest themselves. 
1. Public expenditures on health 
The percentage of public expenditure on health 
declined in most of the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean between 1980 and 
the last year for which we have information 
(about 1986), clearly demonstrating that the 
State was increasingly incapable of responding 
produce some of the goods and services which 
they previously produced or provided 
themselves. It is hardly surprising, then, that the 
capacity of small private enterprises to absorb 
labour developed in step with a drop in urban 
real minimum wages. It is interesting to note in 
this regard that, with the exception of Mexico 
which clearly deviates from this pattern, in all 
the countries the relative growth of employment 
in small enterprises corresponded exactly to the 
drop in urban real minimum wages (table 1). 
To sum up, the stagnation of the modern 
sector considerably reduced the capacity of the 
economy as a whole to offer better jobs and 
shifted large segments of the population 
towards jobs which were less stable, worse paid, 
and practically unprotected by social-security 
services and social benefits. In previous decades 
the possibility of acquiring better jobs had kept 
alive the expectations of social mobility of the 
generations entering the labour market 
—expectations that moreover fulfilled an 
important function in investing the whole social 
order with legitimacy. One of the more worrying 
circumstances of the present state of the labour 
market is the loss of that hope on the part of 
young people, who find it very difficult now even 
to match the economic and social achievements 
of preceding generations, much less surpass 
them. 
to the needs and demands for health services. If 
we take as an approximate measure of the trends 
in the region's expenditure the unweighted 
average percentage of total public expenditure 
on health, it can be seen that this measurement, 
which in about 1980 was 7.7%, had fallen to 
7.2% after mid-decade. However, since in about 
1970 the unweighted measurement was 8.1%, it 
can be concluded that the downward trend is not 
attributable only to the debt crisis but is a 
continuation of a previous trend whose causes 
would have to be investigated. Nevertheless, the 
most probable explanation is that the crisis 
helped to speed up the rate of decline in health 
expenditures in relation to total government 
B. Health 
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spending, since during the 1970s the decline was 
4.9%, according to the unweighted average, 
while in the seven years of the 1980s examined 
here it reached 6.5%. It should be remembered, 
moreover, that the period 1970-1980 was 
relatively expansionary (the per capita product 
increased in fact by around 39%), while the 
period 1980-1987 was one of stagnation (with a 
reduction of the per capita product of around 
6%). Thus the decline in the relative 
expenditure on health in the first period may 
have been compatible with a higher or equal per 
capita expenditure. 
If we examine the behaviour of each country 
separately, we will see that during the 1970s 15 
countries reduced their relative health 
expenditure and 10 raised it, while during the 
first seven years of the 1980s 17 countries 
showed a decline in expenditure and only eight 
an increase. The fact that both real wages and 
total income of most households also declined (a 
fact which among other things was reflected by 
increased poverty) makes it highly probable that 
family spending on health care also declined 
significantly. 
Philip Musgrove1 has argued that since 
health care is a basic need, spending in the sector 
should be reduced less than proportionally when 
income falls, provided of course that the political 
will exists to make health care as independent as 
possible —particularly for sectors with less 
resources— of economic fluctuations. As the 
above figures show, this is not what happened in 
most of the countries of the region. Of the 17 
countries with negative signs between 1980 and 
1987 in the index of the cumulative variation of 
annual product growth rates, only four (Trinidad 
and Tobago, Panama, Paraguay and Honduras) 
significantly increased —by between 38% and 
80%— the percentage of public expenditure on 
health in relation to total expenditure. Two 
other countries (Jamaica and Peru) showed 
small increases —between 2% and 4%— while 
the remaining 11 countries had drops ranging 
from 3% to 60% (the figures for Argentina and 
Costa Rica). As we see, the governments that 
•The text of Philip Musgrove, "Health care and economic 
hardship", World Health, World Health Organization (WHO), 
October 1984, is mentioned in Inter-American Development Bank 
(1DB), Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1989 
Report, Washington, D.C., 1989. 
gave priority to health care during the crisis were 
in a minority in the region. 
The proportion of total government health 
expenditure gives us a good indication of the 
importance that the society or the government 
in question assigns to health in relation to other 
sectors. But from the viewpoint of changes in the 
welfare of the population, the per capita 
expenditure on health is fundamental. As table 3 
shows, of the nine countries for which we have 
reliable information for the period 1980-1986, 
only two (Brazil and Panama) increased their 
per capita expenditure on health. The rest of the 
countries reduced it more or less severely. 
Nevertheless, it is not easy to determine 
with precision how this reduction affected the 
population's state of health. On the one hand, 
the decline in personal income and the 
consequent difficulties in making monthly 
payments probably prompted many people to 
drop out of a number of private health-care 
schemes (insurance, corporations, medical 
mutual associations or co-operatives). At least 
that is what happened in the only place for 
which information on the question was 
available: Montevideo. There the number 
enrolled in such schemes (71.4% of the total 
population in 1981) fell to 65.6% in 1986. The 
increase in unemployment may have had a 
similar effect, since the unemployed and in some 
cases, depending on the characteristics of 
national social-security systems, also their non-
active family members, were probably left 
without the health care that workers and their 
families have a right to. Both trends indicate 
more demands on public health institutions, 
whose resources, as we have seen, were 
significantly reduced. 
Even though this situation most probably 
affected the quantity and quality of the services 
provided, the crisis may also have acted as an 
incentive for raising the efficiency of the service 
or for making it more equitable by reserving the 
scarcer resources for the more needy population 
groups. The insufficiency of the available 
information rules out any judgements as to the 
overall net result of the alternatives mentioned, 
a circumstance which once again focuses the 
discussion on the serious problem of lack of 
statistical information to enable the inputs to be 
related to the results, both in the health field and 
in other social areas. 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF SOME 
HEALTH INDICATORS IN RELATION TO 1980 
























































































































Source: ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, recent years; Latin American Demographic 
Centre (CELADE), direct information; International Monetary Fund (IMF), Government Financial Statistics Yearbook, 
Washington, DC, recent years; United Nations, Statistical Office, Demographic Yearbook, Washington, DC, recent years. 
Note: The consolidated expenditures of the central government at current prices were obtained from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Government Financial Statistics Yearbook, Washington, DC, vol. XII, 1988. The expenditures were adjusted to constant 
prices using the annual indexes of implicit prices in the global GDP at market prices ( 1980 base = 100) of ECLACs Yearbook. The 
populations estimated year by year were obtained from interpolations using the Karup-King method based on five-year projections 
by CELADE. 
2. The ratio of doctors to population 
The reduction of public funds and family 
resources for health care did not lead, as we said 
above, to an overall deterioration in the 
respective indicators. Thus we find that some of 
the indicators commonly used to evaluate the 
performance of social policies in this area do not 
indicate the changes in welfare conditions that 
the crisis led us to expect. 
Such is the case of the number of inhabitants 
per doctor (table 4). In fact, none of the seven 
countries for which we have comparable 
information in the period we are studying 
experienced a reduction in this number. On the 
contrary, most showed increases, varying 
between 16% and 74% between 1980 and the 
last year of the decade for which we have 
information. These data imply a higher average 
probability of every inhabitant receiving 
attention from a medical professional, which 
means, at least potentially, progress in the 
health care of the population at large. 
How is this information to be reconciled 
with the obviously gloomier picture painted by 
the economic data for the decade? First, the 
evolution of the ratio of doctors to population in 
a specific period depends to a large extent on 
previous structural conditions. If we assume that 
it takes an average of between eight and nine 
years to become a doctor, the increase in the 
number of doctors during the 1980s is 
determined more by personal decisions and the 
institutional incentives and facilities prevailing 
during the previous decade. As we know, in 
many countries of the region the 1970s were 
years of economic expansion which, on the one 
hand, allowed the State to increase its per capita 
expenditure on social services such as health and 
education and on the other, certainly raised the 
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people's expectations of improved welfare, 
prompting them to invest in the future with 
reasonable hopes, of higher returns. 
Second, it is impossible to evaluate the effect 
of a larger number of doctors on welfare and 
equity without knowing the evolution of their 
spatial and social distribution. Even though we 
have no information on this point, we can 
venture some conjectures. With regard to spatial 
distribution, we know that during the 1980s the 
urbanization rate remained high in most of the 
countries of the region, although it was lower 
than in the previous decade. Thus we can assume 
that the problems caused by the scarcity of 
health-care centres in rural areas may be 
mitigated in some way, to the extent that the 
population moved to within the range of urban 
health-care institutions. As for social 
distribution, we know that the funds available 
for investment in health care diminished in most 
of the countries of the region and that the pay of 
public-sector health-care workers (including 
doctors) probably fell as much as the pay of 
public employees in general, i.e., more than in 
other sectors (table 3). Thus the deterioration in 
the health-services infrastructure, a growing 
relative lack of technical equipment, and the 
lower economic incentives probably led to 
negative selective recruitment in the public 
health sector, to resignations, to fewer hours 
worked, or to less dedication on the part of the 
more competent professionals. If all this actually 
happened, it may have led to a deterioration in 
health care, especially for the poorer population 
groups that depend precisely on the public sector 
for these services. 
3. The evolution of infant mortality 
The infant mortality rate is usually considered 
one of the more reliable indicators of the 
effectiveness of health-care systems, although its 
evolution in fact is determined by a wide and 
diverse range of factors. Despite the 
insufficiencies in this area, in all the countries of 
the region for which we have updated and 
reliable information the infant mortality rate 
registered a sustained downward trend from 
previous decades up to the end of the 1980s 
(table 4). 
Some advances in health care certainly had 
an impact on the handling of the problem. This 
is true of a number of technological innovations 
widely established internationally, for example 
oral rehydration, which makes it possible to 
combat very effectively the effects of infant 
diarrhoea, one of the main causes of death during 
infancy and simultaneously to reduce the cost of 
the infrastructure needed to tackle the problem, 
thereby making very rapid progress possible in 
this field. To understand its importance, it is 
sufficient to point out that in 1980, when the 
World Health Organization (WHO) began its 
programme to control diarrhoeic diseases, less 
than 1% of the children of the world that 
suffered from these ailments were treated by 
oral rehydration therapy. By 1986, close to 36% 
of the cases of diarrhoea among children under 
five in Latin America and the Caribbean were 
treated with this therapy.2 The campaigns to 
inform the population about the benefits for 
mother and child of spaced births had equally 
notable effects on the reduction of infant 
mortality. Existing public and private 
institutions in the countries concerned 
participated in the campaigns. These same 
institutions were also used to organize and carry 
out rapid campaigns of mass vaccination against 
high- risk early-childhood diseases. 
Other indirect but no less important factors 
also contributed to the decline of infant 
mortality. Urbanization was one of them. Rapid 
urbanization gave many mothers the chance to 
visit health-care centres more often, gave them 
greater access to drinking water and sewage 
services (or at least the possibility of collectively 
expressing and tackling the need to have these 
services suitably provided), and also gave them 
more frequent exposure to a variety of messages 
about infant nutrition, hygiene, pre-natal care, 
etc. Receptivity to these messages and the 
adoption of the corresponding practices were 
also enhanced by the parallel rise of women's 
educational levels. 
2See the report of the World Health Organization (WHO), 
Programa para el control de las enfermedades diarreicas. Sexto 
informe 1986-1987, February 1988, which is mentioned in the 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Estado mundial de la 
infancia 1989, Barcelona, J &J Asociados, 1989. 
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An important characteristic of the factors 
just described is their relatively high degree of 
autonomy in relation to economic difficulties. In 
other words, as the recent history of the region 
shows, the downward trend of infant mortality 
may remain unchanged even if the economy in 
general declines or if the relative inequalities in 
the distribution of goods and services worsen, 
provided of course that such changes remain 
within certain limits. 
The effort to save as many children as 
possible from death has not been, however, the 
exclusive work of governments. A very 
important role is also undoubtedly played by the 
concern and active promotion policies of some 
international organizations, including the 
1. Resources and achievements 
In spite of the economic crisis that affected most 
Latin American countries and the resources 
allocated by governments to this area, education 
maintained and in most cases surpassed the 
quantitative achievements of the previous 
decades. Thus most of the countries maintained 
the target rate of nearly 100% primary-school 
attendance reached in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
rates of transfer from primary to secondary 
education rose, as did the proportion of 
enrollments in secondary and higher education. 
Table 5 presents some indicators selected 
because they illustrate the commonest trends in 
the countries of the region in this field, or more 
specifically in the countries that have data for 
two different years of the decade of the 1980s. 
Thus, as can be seen from the table, in seven of 
the nine countries with data the consolidated 
g o v e r n m e n t expendi tu re per inhab i tan t 
between 5 and 24 years of age fell in real values. 
In nine of the 11 countries, the ratio of teachers 
to the school-age population increased. In five 
(of seven) the rates of transfer from primary to 
secondary education increased. In 11 (of 13) 
secondary enrollment rose. And in eight (of 
nine), higher-education enrollment rose as well. 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and 
WHO, which successfully made the world aware 
of the problem and established the infant 
mortality rate as one of the key indicators for 
evaluating the performance of governments and 
societies in the social field: it is for this very 
reason that many countries have directed a good 
part of their efforts in the social field to 
combating the more immediate causes of infant 
mortal i ty . This has been a for tunate 
development from the viewpoint of achieving 
more equitable welfare conditions, for infant 
mortality is concentrated among the lower-
income groups, so that its reduction tends to 
improve mainly the life expectancy of the poor. 
The data therefore justify the assertion that, 
despite the decline in public expenditure on 
education per potential student, considerable 
progress was made in achieving the universal 
goal of providing wider access to education and 
at the same time changes in the relative supply 
of human resources in primary education. Both 
achievements could be in te rp re ted as 
improvements in the education system. 
Other data from household surveys covering 
the main metropolitan areas of six countries of 
the region reinforce the theory that educational 
systems generally performed positively during 
the period under consideration. Indeed, as table 6 
clearly shows, the number of young people 
between 15 and 24 years of age with only two 
years of primary education fell sharply during 
the period to a level of only 66% of the number 
in the same situation in previous years. Likewise, 
this age group's attendance rate at educational 
establishments rose by between 15% and 20% 
in relation to the previous situation, while the 
number of children repeating years was 7 5 % of 
the corresponding figure for previous periods. 
The only result out of tune with these trends 
seems to be the increase in four countries in the 
rate of school drop-outs, which was around 70% 
higher than at the beginning of the 1980s. It 
C. Education 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA A N D THE CARIBBEAN: INDEXES OF THE EVOLUTION 
OF SOME EDUCATION INDICATORS 
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should be kept in mind, however, that the drop-
out rate varied between 1% and 5%.} 
These results could be compatible with the 
theory of a growing social differentiation 
through education. On the one hand, aggregate 
indicators of transfers, enrollment and repeated 
years could be incorporating the better 
performances of students from population 
groups better endowed with human and material 
resources. Thus the possibly static or even 
declining situation of the less-favoured groups, 
as long as it remains within certain limits, would 
not negatively affect the values of the aggregate 
indicators, thus concealing the heterogeneity of 
the educational performance of the various 
sectors. On the other hand, the quantitative 
advances may be accompanied by changes in the 
quality of education available to the various 
population groups. The need to explain the 
functions that education actually performed in 
the period under study leads us to a consideration 
of the question of the stratification of 
educational circuits. 
2. The stratification of education channels 
'To demonstrate that the increase in school drop-outs and 
the decline in rates of repeated years are compatible with the result 
of gross rates of school attendance at 100% and above we should 
specify, on the one hand, that such rates are obtained from the 
quotient of school enrollment and school-age population, which 
explains how these rates are often above 100%, and on the other 
hand, that while the rates of repeat range between 15% and 30%, 
drop-out rates vary from 1% to 5%, allowing the net result to be 
above 100%. 
In contrast to the growing demands for 
education, the reduction of government funding 
and the strengthening of the principles of 
economic liberalism and its market solutions 
produced, and in some cases accelerated, a 
phenomenon known as stratification of the 
education channels defined as education's loss of 
Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA: SOME EDUCATION AN EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS 














1980 1986 1977 1987 1979 1986 1979 1988 1981 1986 1978 1986 
Education 
Illiteracy in population between 15 and 24 
years of age 
Low educational level in population between 
15 and 24 years of age 
School drop-outs 
Behind in education, population 7-15" 
Behind in education, population 7-15 
Attendance rate, population 15-19 
Attendance rate, population 20-24 
Population between 6 and 11 years of age 
attending paid education 
Population between 12 and 17 years of 
age attending paid education 
Employment 
Economic participation of the population 
between 15 and 19 years of age 
Economic participation of the population 
between 20 and 24 years of age 
Population 15-19 working and studying 
Population 20-24 working and studying 
Unemployed population 15-19 
Unemployed population 20-24 
Economic participation of women in legal 
and common law marriages 
Economic participation of women with children 
Employment of women with children 
Unemployment, male heads of household, 
25-59 years old 
Unemployment, female heads of household, 
25-59 years old 











































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, estimates based on processing of household surveys of the countries. 
"One or more years behind. 
Two or more years behind. 
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homogeneity and of its status as an instrument 
of equity and social cohesion. The phenomenon 
is characterized by a higher proportion, at all 
educational levels, of private as opposed to 
public institutions. In contrast with a public 
education undermined by a lack of resources, 
private education is usually considerably better 
endowed with physical and technological 
infrastructure and offers better teaching 
conditions: since it has more resources, it can 
select teachers more rigorously and ensure a 
more extensive and intensive relationship 
between teachers and students. 
The segmentation of the student population 
resulting from this division not only facilitates 
the operation of the mechanisms that reproduce 
social inequalities and undermine the 
possibilities of integration but also, in the case of 
Latin America with its rapid expansion of the 
educated young population in a context of 
insufficient job opportunities, helps to aggravate 
the consequences of what has been called the 
universal devaluation of education. In summary 
terms, the devaluation of education refers to the 
growing demands that employers make with 
respect to education, so that the jobs themselves 
require more skills as time goes by. Thus young 
people are faced with employers demanding 
labour who know and increasingly take into 
account educational differences; this has a 
discriminatory effect on job opportunities and 
wage levels. In other words, the importance 
which the market attaches to acquired 
knowledge allows only a decreasing proportion 
of the young population to keep alive their 
expectations of social mobility. 
3. Some numerical evidence of the 
stratification of educational 
channels and its consequences 
The privatization of primary and secondary 
education underwent considerable changes 
during the crisis. In some countries, especially 
Chile, it increased sharply; in others, including 
Uruguay, it declined just as sharply. However, a 
more complete analysis would be needed to 
determine if, as is likely, students in the private 
system performed significantly better than those 
in the public system; if there is such a difference 
it would represent an increased heterogeneity of 
education as a whole and would thus accentuate 
the inequalities in cultural and job opportunities, 
depending on the different education which 
citizens receive. 
Because of its objective, this analysis would 
have to focus on aspects of infrastructure, the 
extent of the relationship between teacher and 
student, and curriculum content. But it would 
also have to consider the performance of 
students, the extent of their passage through the 
system, and their achievements within and 
outside the system. Although we only have 
information for Chile in this area, and only for 
some of the aspects mentioned, supplied by the 
research of Cox and Jara (1989), we think that 
the results of the analysis should be considered as 
the expression of a process of increasing 
segmentation and heterogeneity in the 
educational system. 
The data presented by Cox and Jara with 
respect to primary and secondary education in 
Chile in 1987 are as follows: 
a) of those attending public schools, who 
make up 60% of the primary and secondary 
enrollment, 32% finish both cycles —which 
together theoretically last 12 years— in 
approximately 17.3 years, and only 9% finish in 
12 years; 
b) of those attending subsidized private 
schools, representing 33% of total enrollment, 
44% finish both cycles in approximately 15.7 
years and 18% do so in 12 years; 
c) of those attending unsubsidized private 
schools, representing the remaining 7% of total 
enrollment, 67% finish both cycles in 
approximately 13.5 years, and 46% do so in 12 
years. 
In short, in this respect students in the 
private sector clearly perform better than those 
in the public sector, especially as only 9% of 
public-sector students complete both cycles in 12 
years as opposed to 46% in unsubsidized private 
schools. 
The performance of students educated in the 
two systems is also reflected in the results of the 
performance evaluation tests, which measure 
performance on a scale of 0 to 100. In the 
mathematics and Spanish tests, the fourth- and 
eighth-grade students of the schools which, 
according to the Cox and Jara classification, are 
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located at the highest socioeconomic level scored 
22 and 26 points higher, respectively, than 
students from schools at lower socioeconomic 
levels.4 
If we assume that on average there are no 
innate differences among the students attending 
these different kinds of school with respect to 
learning ability, we have to conclude that these 
results eloquently demonstrate the differences 
1. The relationship between social 
changes and economic changes 
Our empirical analysis of the changes produced 
during the 1980s in some of the more important 
aspects of the quality of life demonstrates the 
existence of a considerable degree of 
independence between the fluctuations of the 
various indicators of social progress and between 
them and the indicators of economic 
development. 
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn 
from this independence. First, the evaluation of 
social development is a complex task, and its 
results can therefore vary significantly according 
to the indicators selected for the analysis. Even 
though this conclusion might seem obvious, it is 
not so obvious when set against the abundance of 
assertias about positive and negative changes in 
welfare conditions based on the uncritical use of 
a few indicators. Second, our theories about the 
factors that determine changes in some of the 
more important areas of social development 
clearly need to be reviewed and consolidated, but 
we can already discard all those that assert a close 
and direct correspondence between economic 
4The highest category includes those private schools that cost 
the family an average annual expenditure of 70 000 1984 Chilean 
pesos, and the category just above the lowest one includes public, 
municipal or subsidized schools which require an average annual 
expenditure of 7 000 1984 Chilean pesos. The lowest category was 
not used because of the heterogeneity of the schools included in it. 
between the different kinds of school with 
regard to the way in which knowledge is 
transmitted and its content. Returning to our 
previous argument, we can say that to the extent 
that enterprises are involved in the universal 
trend to demand increasingly higher quality in 
the human resources which they recruit, these 
educational differences will also result later in 
unequal job and wage opportunities. 
changes and the general conditions of the quality 
of life. Third, the fact that there is a relative 
independence between economic and social 
changes indicates at the same time that there is a 
broad field within which governments. can 
choose their policies. 
As a working hypothesis, we will state here 
that the present situation has contributed to the 
situation in which government decisions on 
these various options are increasingly focussed 
more on what we will call the soft areas of social 
policy, i.e., those that offer less resistance to 
change. The present situation seems to be 
characterized by a sharp reduction of 
governments' room to manoeuvre which is 
determined by their need to tackle a multitude of 
tasks at the same time: meeting international 
obligations, operating with a much more limited 
budget than in normal conditions, preventing 
flight of capital, providing incentives for 
national and international investment in the 
country and, lastly, retaining the political 
support of the sectors that back them. However, 
all this has to be reconciled with the strong 
demands for improvements in welfare both 
from those broad sectors of society that suffer 
basic shortages and from the middle classes, 
whose standard of living, as we know, declined 
markedly during the crisis. 
The complexity of evaluating social 
development makes it advisable to divide the 
problem into its component parts and deal one 
II 
Reflections on the meaning of social trends: 
hard and soft areas in social development 
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by one with the specific difficulties posed by each 
of them. A first task would be to investigate the 
nature of the goals of social welfare, basically 
distinguishing between what we will call here 
the soft and the hard goals, according to their 
difficulty of attainment or, to put it another way, 
according to the amount of effort and 
investment which societies and governments 
have to make in order to attain them. A second 
task would be to elaborate a broad concept of 
social development which would provide an 
instrumental definition to guide the choice of 
indicators —a definition of social needs and of 
the elements that satisfy them which would 
necessarily be tentative because of its historical 
background and which would therefore change 
as society and culture change. 
As we will see below, terming a goal hard or 
soft requires a revision of the theories about the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for progress 
in each aspect of welfare. But what we most need 
to remember at this point is that the complexity 
of evaluating social progress is closely related to 
the difficulty of reaching a minimum consensus 
about the degree of hardness of the goals, as well 
as about the way to assess actions designed to 
remove the obstacles to harder or softer goals. 
2. Determinants of the hardness 
of social goals 
Social areas can be distinguished in every society 
and at everyf moment of history, and within 
those areas there are dimensions in which it is 
easier or more difficult to attain certain goals. 
The degree of difficulty is determined basically 
by four closely interrelated factors: a) the 
amount of resources needed to reach the goals; 
b) the institutional conductivity; c) the political 
conductivity; and d) the cultural conductivity of 
the corresponding actions. 
a) Resources 
The design of a social policy, and more 
particularly its implementation, involves 
mobilizing material and human resources, 
knowledge and technologies to which 
governments have varying degrees of access. 
The costs of constructing the necessary 
infrastructure for implanting or widening a 
service's sphere of action depend to a large 
extent on the development of technological 
innovations that lower such costs and thereby 
improve more or less rapidly the quality of life in 
the specific dimension covered by the service. In 
this regard perhaps the most influential 
technological innovation during the last decade 
has been oral rehydration therapy, discussed in 
the section on analysis of the evolution of infant 
mortality. The national and international 
agencies involved in that specific crusade have 
undoubtedly succeeded in calling the attention of 
governments to this problem, identifying it as a 
social defect repulsive to human sensitivity, 
whose rapid reduction has therefore become one 
of the top-priority goals of social policy. But by 
converting the reduction of infant mortality into 
an important social undertaking they also 
succeeded in channeling in that direction a larger 
volume of knowledge and human skills, and this 
was undoubtedly a significant factor in the 
product ion and int roduct ion of those 
technological innovations —such as, for 
example, oral rehydration therapy— which 
made it possible to reduce significantly the costs 
of dealing with the problem. The moral of this 
story is that there is a complex causal 
relationship between the relative cost of the 
various goals of welfare and social equity and the 
priorities set by governments. Even though the 
availability of resources often determines 
priorities, the establishment of clear and 
compelling priorities also makes it possible to 
mobilize wills and reduce costs. In this respect, 
we should add that the capacity of a social goal to 
mobilize people depends not only on its content 
but also on the way it is presented. A 
presentation that makes the goal readily 
understandable facilitates communication and 
makes the concept more popular and its content 
more acceptable. 
b) Institutional conductivity 
Institutional conductivity relates to the 
degree of fluidity in the movement of ideas and 
to the degree of distortion they undergo in the 
bureaucracy before being put into practice. One 
of the main obstacles to the governance of some 
countries of the region lies precisely in the fact 
that the authorities are often incapable of 
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overcoming the resistance of vested interests in 
some of the State bureaucracies or of breaking 
down apathy and motivating government 
officials to perform their function as public 
servants. Strictly speaking, many of the results 
that are usually interpreted as consequences of a 
government's social policies are only the 
virtually immutable results of the inertia of rigid 
institutional patterns established earlier. These 
patterns not only set their own bureaucratic 
goals, which hardly respond to changes in society 
or the government's policies, but they also 
determine the criteria for judging their own 
institutional performance. 
As we saw above, the crisis meant that in 
many countries public-sector recruitment was 
frozen and public-sector wages fell sharply. This 
probably led the more dynamic public officials to 
look elsewhere for work and weakened the 
motivation of the remaining officials for the 
enthusiastic design and implementation of 
innovative policies. 
c) Political conductivity 
Political conductivity relates to the 
resistance, in defence of the status quo, offered 
by interest groups to State interventions, 
especially when these imply direct or indirect 
changes in existing patterns of distribution or 
redistribution, or even when they merely 
threaten the monopoly of the more prominent 
marks of rank or social superiority, as in the case 
of policies designed to make certain services 
universally available. In times of crisis, when the 
struggle for increasingly scarce resources is 
fiercer, the opposition of interest groups can 
generate insuperable barriers to any 
government attempt to create more equitable 
social conditions. One of the consequences of the 
present crisis is indeed the relative weakness of 
the State in dealing with the more influential 
political and economic agents, a weakness that 
derives in part, as we mentioned above, from the 
need for governments to meet international 
obligations, prevent the flight of capital, provide 
incentives for national and international 
investment in the country, and at the same time 
retain the political support of the sectors that 
support it. In this context, the room for 
manoeuvre of social-equity policies is restricted 
to the softer options which are those that 
provoke the least resistance from the main 
pressure groups, since they remain on the 
margins of the redistribution battle. 
d) Cultural conductivity 
Finally, the softness or hardness of a social 
goal is also determined by cultural resistance. 
Take the case, for example, of policies that seek 
to increase social equity by promoting 
homogeneous basic education conditions. We 
know that in most societies there are 
mechanisms, even in public and free schools, 
which concentrate the more experienced 
teachers, the more complete infrastructure, and 
the better teaching materials and equipment in 
the schools where the upper classes study; and 
vice versa, the less experienced staff, the poorer 
installations and the poorer teaching materials 
are found in rural areas or marginal urban 
neighbourhoods. A policy of making these 
conditions more equal would have to concentrate 
the better resources where they are needed in 
order to compensate for the absence of a cultural 
continuum between home and school, and where 
families are less able to provide an upbringing 
that meets the minimum demands of integration 
in a modern society. Some countries, notably the 
United States and Israel, tackled these problems 
with programmes which allowed for a kind of 
interchange between the living standards of the 
different neighbourhoods and the quality of the 
schools, so that, with the busing of children, for 
example, to an educational atmosphere superior 
to their living standards, the mechanisms for 
ever-increasing reproduction of social 
differentiation were broken down and 
homogeneous school environments were 
created in which children from different social 
and ethnic origins could get along with each 
other. 
The degree of hardness of this kind of policy 
would bear a more or less direct relationship to 
the population's receptivity to the message 
which this policy implies. There will be less 
cultural resistance when the message invokes 
elements which form part of a nation's values. In 
contrast, the more segmented a society, the 
higher the barriers of social and/or ethnic 
discrimination between the various social 
groups, and the greater will be the difficulties in 
implementing policies of this type. 
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3. Economic fluctuations and the 
achievement of hard social goals 
Economic stagnation reduces not only the 
resources available to the State for its social 
policies but also its room for manoeuvre in 
setting the priorities that guide resource 
allocation. Indeed, the crisis deepens the struggle 
over the way in which the reduced resources of 
the State must be distributed between and within 
the different social areas, for certain influential 
groups enter the competition for State resources. 
In more prosperous times these groups would 
perhaps have tried to meet their social needs 
through the market (for example, education, 
health care or housing). Thus the crisis poses a 
paradoxical situation, for as the need to use 
collective funds to guarantee satisfaction of the 
basic necessities of an increasing number of 
households grows more imperative, the 
competition in society for scarce resources 
increases, as does the pressure on governments 
to allocate those resources to specific areas. 
This explains two important features of soft 
policies: their attractiveness for governments 
and their relative independence of economic 
difficulties. By concentrating on them, 
governments can demonstrate the clear progress 
resulting from their social policies, whose 
importance for the improvement of welfare and 
equity is indisputable. But what is more, the low 
relative cost, the existence of technological 
innovations that make it possible to implement 
these initiatives, and the fact that they do not 
compete much for funds or threaten privileges 
make this kind of measure politically viable as 
well. 
4. Hardness, welfare and equity 
The hardness of a social area is not ambiguous or 
necessarily associated with its contribution to 
welfare and equity. Relatively soft goals, such as 
reducing infant mortality or eliminating 
illiteracy, are undoubtedly of enormous 
significance for the achievement of higher levels 
of welfare and equity, even when they do not 
directly threaten, in either the short or the 
medium term, the basis of current systems of 
stratification as hard goals are wont to do. This 
last characteristic helps to explain the relative 
facility with which soft goals can generate a 
favourable consensus among very diverse sectors 
and promote national and international 
mobilization. Such characteristics have made it 
possible to harness the energies and creativity of 
individuals and institutions to design, produce 
and implement technologies that lower costs 
and make the infrastructure needed to achieve 
the goals more accessible. 
Even though soft social policies can 
contribute greatly to welfare and equity, we must 
be alert to the possibility that, while progress is 
being made in those areas, both the stratification 
of services and the mechanisms of exclusion and 
inequity that operate in the harder areas may be 
reinforced. Progress in the softer areas frees the 
social terrain from the more worrying 
inequalities —for example, those relating to life 
expectancy at birth (infant mortality) or 
minimum access to the world of information and 
knowledge (literacy)— and generally reveals the 
existence of a basic commitment on the part of 
society to control or eliminate the most severe 
manifestations of extreme poverty. But, as the 
social terrain is cleared of these extreme features 
of inequality, the profile of the central structure 
of social inequality begins to be more clearly 
perceptible. The basic mechanisms for 
reproducing inequality are installed there: for 
example, access according to social origin in the 
early stages of learning to educational services 
differentiated by the quality of education they 
provide. To seek to eliminate such mechanisms 
is indeed to set a hard goal, but one which is 
intrinsic to the achievement of equity, for equity 
implies, as we will see below, the gradual 
elimination of ascriptive criteria in the 
competition to secure social goods. 
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Towards a nominal and operative definition 
of social development based on equity 
For the practical purposes of this study, we 
define social development as a process 
characterized by the achievement of interrelated 
advances in welfare, equity and democracy. 
By greater welfare we mean an increase in 
the availability and accessibility of social and 
economic goods, as revealed by those average 
indicators that show increments in the average 
level of education of the population, life 
expectancy, health and social-security cover and 
services, improvements in housing, quality of 
jobs, and access to all those goods and services 
that determine the quality of life. In spite of the 
global nature of the indicators of welfare and the 
fact that they provide no information on how the 
goods involved are distributed, the meaning of 
differences between two or more values of these 
indicators is easily intelligible. Therefore, other 
factors remaining constant, the degree of social 
development of a country with an average of 
about 12 years of schooling, with paid vacations 
for 95% of its wage earners and with a life 
expectancy of 70 years is greater than that of 
another country with lower averages in each of 
these areas. 
The attainment of certain minimum levels 
of welfare makes it possible to meet basic needs. 
As we will see below, this is one of the three 
criteria most frequently used in defining the 
concept of equity. Each society establishes its 
own minimum levels on the basis of the 
prevailing public view of what are considered 
decent living conditions, with the consequent 
judgement that people who do not attain these 
levels do not have the necessary means 
independently to ensure their own reproduction 
or that of the people who depend on them, and 
that they are in no position to compete for scarce 
goods. The reduction of these forms of exclusion, 
which are the most visible and ethically most 
worrying aspects of social inequality, is a 
necessary first step towards increased social 
integration. From the viewpoint of the 
construction and analysis of social indicators, the 
concern with these aspects of welfare which 
attempt to create the minimum conditions for 
social integration of the excluded is concretely 
expressed in the desire to measure the changes 
in the percentage of households below the 
poverty and destitution lines and in the parallel 
desire to analyse the behaviour of the critical 
indicators (such as infant mortality, illiteracy 
and access to a minimum infrastructure of 
services) which affect such households most of 
all. 
The notion of equity, as applied to social 
matters relates to the distribution of social goods 
(wealth, power and honours) from a normative 
viewpoint, and is applied to action policies or 
programmes (by evaluating their consequences), 
to ideologies (by evaluating the type of 
distribution of privileges implicit in their 
content), or to societies (by evaluating their 
structural characteristics). 
There are three common criteria of progress 
in equity. The first relates to the gradual 
weakening of the association between the 
distribution of privileges and the ascriptive 
characteristics of people, i.e., those that do not 
depend on their skills or talents. The second 
criterion concerns the unequal distribution of 
privileges and the degree of this inequality: 
progress in equity in this regard means that the 
size of this difference is reduced. The third 
relates to the need to improve the situation of 
individuals or households which owing to their 
extreme living conditions do not satisfy the basic 
needs that allow them to reproduce themselves 
biologically and socially. 
According to the first criterion, the level of 
equity or inequity is determined by the degree 
—implicit in a policy, or existing in a social 
structure, or legitimized by an ideology— of the 
association of the characteristics ascribed to 
individuals and the privileges that they possess. 
Ascribed characteristics are those that cannot be 
unchanged or changed only with difficulty, such 
as sex and skin colour —although age, for 
example, is also an ascribed characteristic, as can 
be seen in the case of children whose level of 
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welfare is imposed on them in a way by their 
household. From this perspective, progress in 
equity consists in the gradual weakening of the 
influence of ascribed characteristics on the 
acquisition of social privileges. According to this 
first meaning, therefore, an equitable society will 
be one in which both the dominant values and 
the concrete actions stemming from these values 
are in turn governed by a basic ethical 
imperative, namely that of equal access to social 
goods for all members of the society, regardless 
of their original or ascribed characteristics. 
However, even in societies that can be 
considered equitable in the first sense, i.e., by 
weakening the link between ascribed features 
and achievements they ensure in some way equal 
opportunities for all their members, it can 
happen that the rewards and privileges accorded 
to. achievements can be highly unequal. A society 
with such characteristics would not be equitable 
in the second sense, i.e., according to the 
criterion that defines equity or inequity in terms 
of the unequal distribution of privileges or, more 
exactly, in terms of the independence of the 
possible association of privileges with other 
characteristics of individuals or social categories. 
Therefore, even though it is accepted that a 
community can offer different rewards for 
talent, effort and responsibility, a society will be 
equitable in the second sense only if the 
inequalities do not exceed the limits which the 
dominant ethical standard deems tolerable. 
In the third sense, the notion of equity 
reflects the moral rejection of the existence of 
households whose members cannot meet their 
basic needs, a situation which would suppose the 
presence of barriers to mobility and integration 
for specific social categories and/or the inability 
of the society's system of rewards to secure the 
performance of various social functions. From 
this perspective, the inequity of poverty will be 
commensurate with the wealth of the society in 
which it exists, i.e., with the unequal distribution 
of privileges. 
The existence of these three different 
concepts of equity immediately poses a number 
of questions about, for example, the usefulness 
of the distinction, the relationship between the 
elements of each of the notions, and ways of 
measuring them better. The separation of the 
elements of the concepts is certainly useful for 
comparative analysis, since societies can show 
more or less favourable results in each of them. 
In fact, the more equitable societies are those 
that present a particular combination of these 
factors so that, for example, ascribed criteria 
have little influence on the distribution of 
privileges, inequalities in the distribution of 
power, prestige and wealth are kept with the 
limits which prevent too wide a gap between the 
members of the various strata, and only 
relatively small groups of the population live in 
conditions of poverty. The opposite occurs of 
course in less equitable societies. But what is 
important to point out here is that, at least in 
theory, each of these factors can vary relatively 
independently of the other two, even when the 
more ascriptive societies tend in fact to have 
higher levels of inequality and more poverty, just 
as in fact the less ascriptive societies tend to 
manifest the opposite characteristics. 
With respect to the relationship between the 
various factors, we have already mentioned that 
the inequity of poverty is accentuated when the 
wealth surrounding it is greater. The same 
argument can be made about inequalities, in the 
sense that their inequity increases with the 
ascriptive bias of each society. This prompts us 
to emphasize that, taken separately, none of the 
three factors (ascription, inequality and poverty) 
permits evaluation of the level of equity in a 
society, and that judgements in that regard have 
to be based on a simultaneous assessment of all 
three. This also means that every society which 
sets equitable development as an objective will 
have to formulate targets regarding the tolerable 
margins for the influence of ascribed 
characteristics on the distribution of privileges, 
for the size of those differences, and for the 
extent and severity of the poverty. 
With respect to the problems posed by the 
measurement of these three dimensions of 
equity, the indicators of progress or regression in 
the ascribed component of equity are expressed 
in coefficients of association that permit 
evaluation of the degree of independence 
between the distribution of social goods and the 
ascribed attributes of individuals. Indicators 
based on coefficients of dispersion are used to 
investigate the magnitude of the inequalities. 
Lastly, the percentages of the total population 
consisting of individuals or households that do 
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not meet some of the needs that every society 
considers basic indicate the score achieved by 
that society in the third component of equity. 
In conclusion, we will state that in this sense, 
social development implies that advances in the 
growth and equitable distribution of its fruits 
should be achieved within a context of 
democracy, which basically means increasing the 
participation of citizens in decisions on the 
content of national objectives, on the social 
definition of collective needs, on the role that 
education, health care, social security, etc., should 
play in conducting a society towards collectively 
defined objectives and, finally, on the 
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